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Abstract: We consider a cloud data storage involving three entities, the cloud customer, the cloud business centre 
which provides services, and the cloud data storage centre.  Data stored in the data storage centre comes from a variety of 
customers and some of these customers may compete with each other in the market place or may own data which comprises 
confidential information about their own clients. Cloud staff have access to data in the data storage centre which could be 
used to steal identities or to compromise cloud customers. In this paper, we provide an efficient method of data storage 
which prevents staff from accessing data which can be abused as described above. We also suggest a method of securing 
access to data which requires more than one staff member to access it at any given time. This ensures that, in case of a 
dispute, a staff member always has a witness to the fact that she accessed data. 
 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The importance of minimizing information leakage 
in a cloud computing environment is highlighted by 
the current use of the cloud infrastructure for 
applications that require strong confidentiality 
guarantees. Such applications include e-commerce 
services, medical records services and back-office 
business (Ristenpart et al. 2009).  
Clouds are sources of large datasets that can be 
harvested by attackers to obtain private and personal 
information that can lead to identity compromise and 
can result in both “true” identity theft, where true 
information is used to steal the identity of a real 
person, and “synthetic” identity theft, where true and 
fake information is used to create a fake identity. 
Unrestricted and unmonitored access by insiders to 
diverse datasets can result in both kinds of identity 
theft – hence there is a need to restrict access by 
insiders to data stored in cloud data centres.  
We note that encryption of data within the cloud 
will prevent some unauthorized access; but data 
must be decrypted in order to be processed. There is 
no current practical method for encryption of data in 
such a way that the data can be processed in the 
cloud without decryption. However, there is recent 
theoretical work in this direction by Gentry (Gentry, 
2009), based on homomorphic encryption methods, 
suggesting that it may be possible. The problem for 
the foreseeable future is that, using this method, the 
processing time for even small amounts of data is 
infeasible (Cattedu, 2009).  
 
1.1 The Threat Model 
We consider a cloud data storage involving three 
entities, the cloud service customer (CSC), the cloud 
service provider (CSP) which provides services, and 
the cloud service operator (CSO) (see Figure 1). 
From time to time, as part of their normal work 
allocation, staff in the CSP access data in storage. 
The data stored in the data storage centre comes 
from a variety of customers and some of these 
customers may compete with each other in the 
market place or may own data which comprises 
confidential information about their own clients.  
A large number of staff work in the CSP and job 
volatility may be high. It is therefore not feasible to 
perform elaborate security checks on staff, nor to 
monitor them extensively. The staff potentially have 
access to data in the data storage centre which could 
be used to steal identities to sell on the black market, 
or to blackmail a cloud customer. 
The objective of this paper is to establish a cloud 
architecture which minimizes the opportunity for 
such information harvesting. 
1.2 Related Work 
In (Wang et al., 2010) a third party auditor is 
proposed which employs a series of cryptographic 
methods to verify that data has been processed 
according to the agreement between the cloud 
service and the customer. This is a cumbersome 
method that does not scale to large clouds. Although 
it prevents reading of data by the auditors, it does 
not prevent reading of data by cloud staff.  
  
 
A completely different approach was taken by 
(Parakh and Kak, 2009), who focus on methods of 
storing data within the cloud environment by 
splitting it into retrievable components before 
storing it. Thus, a set of medical records might be 
fragmented in such a way that the viewing of one 
fragment reveals no usable information to the reader. 
The roots of a polynomial are used to allocate data 
components to storage locations. The authors admit 
that for the management of many large data sets, this 
method is inefficient for the purposes of data 
processing. They provide an alternate data security 
method in this case, whereby a staff member uses a 
secret sharing scheme to generate different keys for 
different components of a data set and encrypts each 
component with a separate key. This protects the 
data while in storage from being corrupted. It also 
prevents access to the data by any other staff 
member. However, it suffers from the drawback that 
the staff member generating the keys can access the 
entire data set, and must be trusted not to reveal the 
keys to others. 
In this paper, we provide an efficient method of 
data storage which prevents staff accessing data and 
which can be used in the threat model described 
above. We also suggest a method of securing access 
to data which requires more than one staff member 
to access it at any given time. This ensures that, in 
case of a dispute, a staff member always has a 
witness to the fact that she accessed data. 
In the next section, we motivate the work with a 
detailed scenario based on medical data. In Section 
3, we describe the basic cloud storage model and our 
approach in separating data within the storage centre 
area. Section 4 describes a secret sharing scheme 
method for ensuring that no single person may 
access a data storage area alone. In Section 5, we 
consider how to adapt this scheme to the situation of 
staff joining or departing the cloud business centre. 
Finally, in Section 6, we draw conclusions and 
propose some areas for future work. 
2 MOTIVATING SCENARIO 
Assume that Jo is an individual whose data is stored 
in the databases of a number of organizations; this 
includes an automobile registration organization, a 
government health plan, a pharmacy and an 
insurance company. All four organizations employ 
Cloud X to store and process their data. Thus, in 
Cloud X, the complete identity information relating 
to Jo can be represented as a 4-tuple <C1, C2, C3, 
C4>, where Ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, refers to the data of each of 
the organizations. If data relating to the different 
categories of Jo‟s personal identity information is 
stored in the same location in a cloud data area, then 
it is clear that an insider can easily capture the 
identity information required to impersonate her. 
Further, having captured the identity information, 
the attacker will be able to harvest different types of 
information relating to the stolen identity leading to 
privacy disclosure. For instance, if C2 was the 
individual‟s, Medicare number, the insider can 
execute a combined query using C3 and C4 on the 
medical records database stored in the cloud 
infrastructure to synthesize the medical history of a 
given individual. This can be attractive especially 
for say, medical insurance providers who can then 
unfairly take into account the person‟s detailed 
medical history while assessing their application for 
medical insurance cover. By periodic information 
harvesting over the datasets in the cloud, expensive 
claims can be predicted leading to unfair termination 
of insurance policies. 
Equally important is the fact that information 
such as medical history, medical conditions and 
related drug usage is evolving information that can 
be exploited by insider abuse (Cavoukian, 2008). 
For instance, trends in the medical conditions of “at 
risk”, individuals such as the elderly or people with 
pre-conditions can be monitored – frequent visits to 
the GP may be used as an indicator of a recurring or 
on-going medical condition that might result in 
hospitalization and possibly an expensive claim or 
the prescription of pregnancy-related drugs may be 
perceived as indicating the medium to short-term 
plans of an individual to start a family. 
Hence, while it is important that data be stored in 
the cloud in a distributed manner to ensure that 
insider compromise is minimized, it is equally 
critical that data access is tightly controlled to ensure 
that information leakage leading to identity theft and 
privacy disclosure can be prevented.  
3 THE CLOUD STORAGE 
REFERENCE MODEL 
We refer again to Figure 1. A CSC rents storage 
from a CSP and pays for the amount of storage their 
data is actually consuming or for what the CSCs 
have allocated. CSCs range from individuals, small 
businesses and financial institutions to Fortune 500 
firms to governments. The management of the 
storage is done solely by the CSOs, and thus CSCs 
are relieved of the burden of maintaining storage 
infrastructure. The CSOs migrate data between 
storage tiers, set up connections, maintain disk 
drives, manage firmware upgrades, establish virtual 
machine replication timetables, take snapshots as 
  
 
well as scheduled data backups and are responsible 
for safe storage of the backup media (Abawajy, 
2009). 
     The CSPs own the cloud resources and expertise 
in building and managing cloud storage servers. 
They provide data storage as a service, which is 
virtualised storage on demand over a network to 
CSCs based on a request for a given, agreed quality 
of service. The use of virtualisation allows CSPs to 
maximise storage resource utilisation by 
multiplexing data storage of many cloud customers 
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Figure 1: The Cloud Storage Reference Model 
 
across a shared physical infrastructure. The term 
multi-tenancy is commonly used to describe sharing 
of cloud storage among multiple customers who 
could be separate companies, or departments within 
a company, or even just different applications. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Secure data storage. 
 
The deployment of data storage as a service is 
powered by data centres at different geographical 
sites (site 1, site 2, … , site n in Figure 1) over the 
Internet running in a simultaneous, cooperative and 
distributed manner. Most service providers allow 
CSCs to store unstructured database blocks, which 
are then mirrored in partial segments over multiple 
storage sites. Once the data is stored on the cloud, 
CSCs do not control and may not even know the 
exact location of their data and copies may be hosted 
in the cloud. Thus, a cloud environment can result in 
a loss of transparency about where client data is 
stored and this can have legal implications. 
A service consumer is able to perform a variety 
of actions on her data including the ability to create, 
update, append, reorder and delete their stored data. 
The CSCs interact with the cloud servers via the 
cloud middleware. The middleware incorporates 
components such as different storage protocols 
including file-based options and block-based 
options, advanced data replication techniques, access 
control mechanisms, storage provisioning and 
storage metering (Buyya et. al., 2010; Yildiz, et. al., 
2009). CSCs need to allocate storage before they can 
use it. Also, the storage usage metering component 
provides CSCs with information on how much 
storage their data consumed so that they know what 
their bill will be at the end of the billing cycle. 
The cloud creates unique requirements for data 
in terms of security and manageability. Once the 
data is stored, it is completely under the control of 
the cloud service provider. As users no longer 
possess their data locally, it is of critical importance 
to assure users that their data are being correctly 
stored and maintained (Wang et al., 2010). An  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
obvious threat to the customer data sets is from 
malicious insider abuse. Thus, one of the key issues 
in data storage for clouds is to effectively detect any 
unauthorized data modification and corruption, 
possibly due to server compromise or attacks that 
rely upon subverting a cloud‟s administrative 
functions via malicious insider abuse. 
Our aim is to ensure that no employee working 
in the cloud can access separate data sets which, 
combined, might yield information which is 
considered to be private or confidential. In order to 
ensure this, we propose pre-classification of data by 
the customer itself according to a cloud service 
determination in order to be able to store data in 
separate fire-walled and access protected data centre 
areas. The customer will be asked to classify its data 
into one of several categories. A single category 
might be health data such as medical insurance, 
hospital and pharmaceutical information. Those data 
sets belonging to the same category would be 
separated in storage. Figure 2 describes how this 
would be done. In the health data example, all three 
data sets would be classified as being in the same 
category C1 and therefore stored in three separate 
areas. Other data not in the same category can be 
stored with C1 data as shown in the Figure. The 
condition is that no two data sets in the same 
category should be stored in the same data centre. 
This requires enough data storage centres to store all 
data in any one category at any given time.  In a 
virtual machine environment, however, it is a trivial, 
and normal, task to establish additional data centres 
as needed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  A secret sharing scheme used in securing access 
to data. 
 
4 ACCOUNTABILITY – THE USE 
OF SECRET SHARING 
SCHEMES 
Secret sharing schemes have been used by 
(Upmanyu, 2010) in designing a provably-secure 
privacy-preserving protocol to limit access to related 
data sets stored in the cloud.  Their method is 
substantially more efficient than previous known 
methods, but still adds noticeable cost to the cloud 
service. We approach the goal of securing access in 
two ways. One is by means of the cloud architecture 
itself, compartmentalizing and separating the storage 
spaces, as described in the previous section; the 
other is by means of cryptographic access and 
authentication procedures. These access and 
authentication procedures need to be mapped across 
the compartmentalized cloud structure. 
Since our aim is to ensure that no employee 
working in the cloud can access separate data sets 
which, combined, might yield information which is 
considered to be private or confidential, a secret 
sharing scheme will be used to ensure that no set of 
less than t, for some fixed value t, people can 
collaborate to gain access to enough data sets from 
the same category to be able to deduce information 
which is confidential. 
 
DEFINITION: Let t and w be positive integers, t ≤ 
w.  A (t,w)-threshold secret sharing scheme is a 
method of sharing a message M among a set of w 
participants in such a way that any t participants can 
reconstruct the message M, but no subset of smaller 
size can reconstruct M. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Adi Shamir invented the first such scheme in 1997 
(Menezes et al.,1997) and it is based on the idea of 
Lagrange interpolation, or, equivalently, the fact that 
knowing n+1 points of a degree n polynomial 
determines the whole polynomial. 
    Here, we shall set up a secret sharing scheme in a 
finite field over a prime, GF(p), where a secret M is 
represented as a number modulo the prime p, and we 
want to split M among w people in such a way that 
any t can reconstruct the message, but no fewer than 
t people can do so.  
We randomly choose t-1 coefficients si (mod p) 
and define the polynomial 
 
 s(x) = M+s1x+…+st-1x
t- 1(mod p).                        (1)                                   
 
Any of p possible choices for x will result in a 
value for s(x). These values need not all be distinct. 
We can thus distribute up to p „shares‟ in the secret 
to participants, of the form (x, s(x)). Note that s(0) = 
M, so this share will not be used. As long as w ≤ p-1, 
we have a (t,w)-threshold secret sharing scheme as 
any t participants can combine their shares and solve 
a system of equations which will determine M. No 
fewer than t people can do this. 
In a cloud services situation, some staff may 
have seniority which permits them to hold more than 
one share of a secret which allows access to a data 
centre; this will be determined in-house. However, 
no matter how many shares of a secret a person 
holds, they should never have enough shares to 
determine the secret alone. This ensures that each 
employee can be held accountable for accessing a 
data centre based on the evidence of a third party; it 
also provides a witness to the fact that an employee 
acted appropriately in accessing data. 
     
In addition, the same set of people should never 
be able to access two data centres holding 
information which cannot be shared. Thus, 
conditions on distribution of any secret sharing 
scheme apply as below. 
CONDITIONS 
(i) Any data centre needs at least two people to 
be able to access it, 
(ii) The same set of people should never hold 
shares to a key accessing different data 
centres holding data of the same category. 
 
Figure 3 describes the data and business centres with 
access based on secret sharing schemes.  
 
Example.  
Here, we give an example of a secret sharing scheme 
which satisfies the two conditions above. Let M = 
190503180520 be the secret message and let p = 
1234567890133. (Note that p is greater than M.)  We 
construct a (3,6)-threshold scheme as follows. We 
choose 
s(x) =  M + 482943028839x + 1206749628665x
2  
modulo p                     
where s1 = 482943028839 and s2 = 1206749628665. 
And now we distribute shares of the secret to 8 
participants, using values of x from 1 to 8. The 
shares are: 
 (1, 645627947891) 
 (2, 1045116192326) 
 (3, 154400023692) 
 (4, 442615222255) 
 (5, 675193897882) 
 (6, 852136050573) 
 (7, 973441680328) 
 (8, 1039110787147) 
 
The first four people are each given one share, 
person i receiving share (i, s(i)) above. 
Person 5 is given shares 5 and 6 and person 6 is 
given shares 7 and 8. Since 3 shares are needed to 
determine the secret, condition (i) automatically 
applies.  
 
Suppose shares 1, 2 and 7 are allocated to access 
the first data centre in Figure 3. Then shares 1, 2 and 
8 cannot be allocated to access the second or the 
third data centres; this is because the same person 
holds shares 7 and 8 and can use either, together 
with share-holders 1 and 2 to breach condition (ii).  
 
A cloud service business is dynamic; staff come 
and go, as do data and files. If an additional data 
centre must be set up, then the existing secret 
sharing scheme must be adapted to cope without a 
complete re-distribution of secret shares. Similarly, 
if a staff member arrives or departs, shares need to 
be allocated or deleted from the existing scheme. In 
this paper, we discuss only this latter case of a 
dynamic staffing situation. We leave a dynamic data 
situation for future work as it requires a different 
approach. 
 
 
5     A DYNAMIC STAFFING 
SITUATION AND 
DYNAMIC SECRET 
SHARING SCHEMES 
Each data centre is accessed by means of a secret M 
from a secret sharing scheme as in equation (1). In 
order that condition (ii) be maintained, it is 
necessary to use different equations for different 
  
 
data centres. Nevertheless, different equations with 
the same secret for different data centres is 
permissible as different sets of shares need to be 
used to compute the secret.  
5.1 Extending Secret Sharing Schemes 
in Order to Add Staff 
The lemmas in this section describe how to adjust 
secret sharing schemes to accommodate staff who 
leave or join the service provider. Lemma 1 shows 
that as long as the parameters are within prescribed 
bounds, an additional staff member can easily be 
accommodated. 
  
LEMMA 1. Let t and w be positive integers, 2 ≤  
t ≤ w ≤ p-1, p a prime.  Any (t,w)-threshold secret 
sharing scheme over GF(p) based on (1) with w +1 
≤  p - 1 can be extended to a (t,w+1)-threshold 
secret sharing scheme over GF(p) also based on (1). 
PROOF. Suppose we have a (t,w)-threshold 
secret sharing scheme over GF(p) based on (1) with 
w +1 ≤  p - 1. Since w  <  p – 1, we can distribute an 
additional share based on (1), thus resulting in a 
(t,w+1)-threshold secret sharing scheme over GF(p). 
QED. 
 
The above lemma and its proof describe how a 
staff member can be added to a scheme which 
continues to need t members to access a secret. As 
long as the bounds are met, members can continue to 
be added. We thus have the following. 
 
COROLLARY.  Let t, w and r be positive 
integers, 2 ≤  t ≤ w ≤ w+r  ≤  p-1, p a prime.  Any 
(t,w)-threshold secret sharing scheme over GF(p) 
based on (1) with w +1 ≤  p - 1 can be extended to a 
(t,w+r)-threshold secret sharing scheme over GF(p) 
also based on (1). 
 
In order to allow flexibility in adding many staff, 
the prime p is normally chosen to be much larger 
than the potential number of staff. The situation of 
staff departing is somewhat more difficult. The 
shares of departing staff must be revoked and we 
deal with this in the next two sub-sections.  
 
5.2. Revocation Lists 
 
As staff leave, each data centre stores revoked 
shares. To prevent a set of t shares, at least one of 
which is revoked, from accessing a secret M 
associated with a data centre, the polynomial (1) is 
adjusted to the following: 
 
s(x) = (M*Π(x – ri))/Π(x – ri) + s1x + … + st-1x
t-1
 
(mod p)                                                                 (2) 
 
where the product is taken over the abscissa of each 
revoked share. When a non-revoked value for x is 
substituted, the coefficient of M is 1, and (2) reduces 
to (1). However, when a revoked value for x is used, 
the coefficient of M is not computable, M is not 
revealed and access is denied. 
   Revocation can continue to the point where 
precisely t associated shares are available to access a 
data centre, but not beyond. The service provider 
must ensure that enough shares are available at any 
time in order to access the data centre. Thus, we 
have the following lemma. 
 
LEMMA 2.  Any (t,w)-threshold secret sharing 
scheme over GF(p) based on (2) with 2 ≤  t ≤ w ≤ p-
1, p a prime, permits revocation of up to w-t shares 
while still operating as a (t,r)-threshold secret 
sharing scheme over GF(p) based on (2) with 2 ≤  t 
≤ r ≤ w ≤ p-1. 
 
   If a revoked share is used in attempting to gain 
access to a data centre, the authentication centre can 
determine which share it was and hence also to 
whom it belongs. While equation (2) does not reveal 
this, the following does. Once a set of t shares fails 
to produce the secret, the authentication centre 
compares each submitted share with each entry in 
the list of revoked shares to find a match and thus 
also identifies the owner. 
 
5.3. Managing Revocation Lists 
 
Since p-1 shares can be distributed, up to p-1-t 
shares can be revoked with a usable secret sharing 
scheme remaining. Once p-1-t+1 = p-t shares are 
revoked, the scheme is no longer usable and a new 
threshold secret sharing scheme must be deployed.  
   The current share holders may retain their 
existing shares if a new polynomial is designed in 
the following way: retain the t-1 or fewer existing 
valid shares. Choose additional pairs randomly, but 
excluding all revoked shares from the first scheme, 
so that a total of t’ pairs is available where t’ is to be 
the threshold of the new scheme. Use these t’ pairs 
to determine uniquely a polynomial of the form (1) 
over some (large) prime p’. This new polynomial 
can now be used to formulate p’ shares, such that the 
holders of old shares retain these.  
 
  
 
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE 
WORK 
We have presented two approaches, which can be 
combined, to protection of data inside a cloud 
service centre.  One, expressed in Figure 2, stores 
the data in such a way as to separate data of similar 
„types‟. The second deals with allocating shares to 
cloud staff in such a way that access to more than 
one data set of the same type is prevented. Thus, in 
allocating shares, conditions (i) and (ii) must not be 
violated; refer to Figure 2.  
     We showed that in such a setting revocation of up 
to a certain number of shares distributed to staff can 
be easily managed. 
     We leave for future work the following problem: 
automate an efficient scheme for allocation of shares 
in a dynamic environment (staff leaving and joining) 
such that conditions (i) and (ii) are always valid. 
Extend this scheme so that it includes the addition 
and removal of data centres. 
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